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ABSTRACT This paper discusses some aspects of innovation in China. As China seeks to
transition to a knowledge-based economy, it may become more important for China to
develop innovative technologies to sustain economic growth. How do China’s history,
culture, institutions, and organizations aid or hinder innovation? How does China’s
national innovation system compare to the innovation culture in the US, as well as other
developed and emerging economies? What are the prospects for the future of the Chinese
national innovation system?
Our starting point is the Needham Puzzle – the paradox that while China was once a
world leader in technological development, it fell behind; the Industrial Revolution
happened in Europe rather than in China. Potential explanations for the Needham Puzzle
may shed light on the challenges facing innovation in modern China. We identify three
factors that might help explain the Needham Puzzle; assess how the Needham Puzzle and
Chinese culture and history have affected the modern innovation system; discuss
comparative aspects of innovation ecosystems in the United States and elsewhere; and
suggest that Chinese innovation emphasizes exploitation and refinement of existing
knowledge to the exploration and development of new knowledge. We also discuss
implications for the future of innovation in China.
KEYWORDS China, competition, innovation, R & D
INTRODUCTION
Why is it that Portuguese ships appeared on the coast of China in the early 16th
century and Chinese ships did not appear on the coast of Portugal? Why did the
Industrial Revolution not begin in China? Why did China land on the moon decades
after the former Soviet Union? Scientists in China were prolific inventors and world
leaders in technological development until the middle of the Ming Dynasty (1368
AD–1644 AD). Why is it that they fell behind? Chinese society was responsible
for, famously, four great inventions: the compass, gunpowder, paper, and printing.
Less famously, Chinese inventors are attributed the sternpost for sailing ships and
drilling for natural gas far inland (to boil water for its residual salt because it was
too costly to ship salt from the sea). China was also early in developing a system of
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organized government, had a high level of agricultural and military advancement,
and its use of iron was much greater than Europe’s (Lin, 2008). Not only in terms
of inventions, but also in terms of organizations and applications did China have a head
start.[1] The relative lack of technological development after the Ming Dynasty has
been called the ‘Needham Puzzle’, after a British economist and historian who, with
colleagues, conducted seminal work cataloguing Chinese contributions to science in
the historical period and the sudden fall-off. How might this historical phenomenon
affect modern Chinese innovation?
In this paper we discuss how understanding aspects of its history might illuminate
how certain institutional, organizational, and psycho-cultural barriers may have
affected China’s national innovation system in technological innovation, and
how China might overcome those barriers.[2] We do not address any of the
grand governmental, institutional, or political issues China faces, but focus on
its continuing quest for innovation (Rowen, Hancock, & Miller, 2008). Innovation
in modern China involves integrated efforts of the larger innovation ecosystem of
business, academia, and government, and it has strengths and weaknesses just like
other national innovation systems. Understanding those strengths and weaknesses
in terms of their historical, organizational, psycho-cultural, and institutional aspects
might help us understand China’s future paths toward innovation.
There seems to be evidence that Chinese innovation is different from western
innovation; recent work has suggested there are a variety of reasons, ranging from
different approaches to R&D, to patent law and legal frameworks, to the role of
research institutes in Western versus Chinese society (Gebhardt, 2013; Kristensen
& Nielsen, 2013; Liu, Simon, Sun, & Cao, 2011; Plechero & Chaminade, 2013).
Some suggest – implicitly or explicitly – that the modern Chinese style in innovation
may emphasize imitation of existing technologies, at least at the product and process
level over innovation (Dobson & Safarian, 2008; Xie & Li-Hua, 2009; Xie & White,
2006; Zhou, 2006). This may be in part due to higher R&D costs and long-term
benefits (and short term costs) associated with innovation (Cheung & Lin, 2004).
Doing so may be advantageous at present. But what might seem like doing ‘what
seems right’ from a short-term perspective does not mean ‘doing the right thing’
from a long-term organizational and societal point of view. A strategy of imitation
rather than innovation, or of exploitation rather than exploration, may have short
term advantages in terms of saving on costs and risk taking (March, 1991; Rowen
et al., 2008) – but only as long as others are willing and able to bear the costs of
innovation.
If one accepts that Chinese organizations may in the short term be better in
(and better off) imitating than innovating on a technological basis, it still raises
questions: How and why did the Chinese lead in science and technology diminish?
Are there historical explanations for the present style of innovation? Is China alone
in practicing this style of technological ‘catch-up’? Will Chinese innovators, and
the organizations of which they are a part, persist in the present style of innovation
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through inertia, or will they change their approach to cope with a globalized
economic environment?
Efforts to cast light on China’s past history of innovation have led to widely varied
explanations for China’s gap relative to Europe. Some argue that China’s increased
population and decreased man-to-land ratio led to a decline in the search for value-
increasing technological innovations (Lin, 2008). Others suggest that China got
trapped in a legal structure of weak property rights and low appropriability regimes
(Chen, 2012; Landes, 2006), or that the structural lack of capitalistic institutions and
ideas did not provide incentives for continuing innovation (Baark, 2007). Some have
also pointed to the inherent conservatism in Confucian values to be an underlying
force against reforms and economic development, and the structure of family
and society providing a system that created and mentored administrators, not
innovators (Landes, 2006; Nguyen, 2009; Pye, 2000; Zhou, 2011). Over time, these
(and other) factors may have led Chinese organizations to rely on routines for
imitation rather than on routines for innovation. And as the routines literature
has pointed out since at least March and Simon (1958) (Becker, 2004), routines are
powerful preservers of status quo and often-powerful barriers to change, negative or
positive.
This paper examines possible psycho-cultural, organizational, economic,
societal, and institutional enablers and barriers to innovation in Chinese
organizations, and how they may have changed over time. For innovation – like
any other complex organizational issue – is rarely (if ever) the result of just one or
two features, but rather a result of complex adaptive processes between institutions,
individuals, cultures, societies, and ideas. In particular, the paper will discuss some
aspects of what is sometimes called ‘the Needham Puzzle’ and how it relates China’s
historical and current quest to strengthen its national innovation system.
The hope is not to provide grand answers for how Chinese organizations can
become more innovative overnight, but to raise awareness of some of the important
historical, psycho-cultural, organizational, societal, and organizational issues which
shape an organization’s or country’s long-term ability to adapt and innovate. These
could be easily overlooked if one is too focused on studying the short-term ‘success’
of innovations. The darker side – the importance of failure and the role of creativity
– must be encouraged, too, even if its short-term costs often outweigh its benefits
(March, 2010). In that sense, we try and integrate insights from organization
theory, studies of Chinese business innovation, and insights into the psycho-cultural
aspects of Chinese behavior, and how those may influence organizational behaviors
(Crozier, 1967).[3]
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 looks into explanations for
the Needham puzzle to contextualize the analysis of modern Chinese innovation.
Section 3 discusses how the technological gap may influence the modern innovation
system. Section 4 discusses the modern Chinese innovation system. Section 5
concludes.
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THE NEEDHAM PUZZLE IN CONTEXT
The . . . campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has
no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present
. . . struggle, but will be world wide (Mao, 1937).
China led the world in new technological development up through the middle of the
Ming Dynasty (mid-17th century). Chinese civilization has been lauded for the ‘four
great inventions’: the compass, gunpowder, papermaking, and printing. Chinese
scientists not only developed new technologies, but crucial for innovation, applied
them in useful ways. For instance, Chinese scientists not only invented gunpowder,
but also applied it to warfare: ‘we can trace a rational development of gunpowder
from the humble firecracker (known in the sixth century of our era) which was
originally employed in religious ceremonies, to the launching of fiery projectiles in
warfare as early as the twelfth century, and the full development of fire weapons
under the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’ (Laufer, 1917: x).
Chinese utilization of iron was higher than Europe’s contemporaneously (Lin,
2008). Chinese merchants were involved early in overseas trade and commercial
pursuits, which provided imported goods and increased wealth. The Chinese
educational system was strong and had diversity, with scholars coming from
Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist traditions serving as tutors in more than 100
private academies, which admitted outstanding students even if they could not pay,
promoting intellectual development and scholarship.
With such a strong foundation, why did China fall behind in the development
and application of new technology? Why did the Industrial Revolution not begin
in China before it began in Europe? China’s relative lack of technological progress
as compared to Europe has been termed the ‘Needham Puzzle’ after Joseph
Needham, a British scientist and historian active in the mid-20th century who
conducted significant research on the history of Chinese science. According to
Lin (2008), ‘[e]vidence documented in the monumental works of Joseph Needham
and his collaborators show that, except in the past 2 or 3 centuries, China had
a considerable lead over the Western world in most of the major areas of science
and technology’. Needham was a British biochemist who served in the Sino-British
Science Cooperation Office in Chongqing, where the Chinese government had
withdrawn during the Second World War. While there, he addressed the question
posed above: Why, given the great accomplishments of historical China, did the
scientific and industrial revolutions occur in Europe? To help answer this question,
he sent out teams to collect materials on Chinese inventions and from these have
come many volumes written by Needham and his students documenting the many
inventions made.
Needham documented his work with a number of Chinese collaborators in a book
series called Science and Civilisation in China (Needham, 1980). The volumes in this
series each had a theme covering a broad scientific area – for example, Volume 4,
Part 3 described Civil Engineering and Nautics, while Volume 5, Part 7 described Military
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Technology: The Gunpowder Epic. Needham and his colleagues’ interests spanned the
entire breadth of Chinese technological achievement. What is remarkable is not
that Chinese civilization produced such a variety of innovation; but rather, that at
some point, the pace of innovation started lagging behind that of Europe, despite
China’s endowments in human capital and in natural resources. The Chinese great
inventions appeared before the era of rapid European technological progress; and for
a while, Chinese development and application of technology was at least at parity
with Europe.
At some point, there was a divergence. Some scholars have measured divergence
in terms of wages and prices and find that China began diverging from Europe on
a productivity basis by the 1500s (Broadberry & Gupta, 2006). European scientific
advancement arising from the Scientific Revolution (itself a product of the late
Renaissance), the proliferation of knowledge through the advent of movable type,
and demographic and economic changes arising from the Black Death may have
contributed to Europe’s scientific advances. These were factors that contributed to
the Industrial Revolution and with it, the western world’s continued pre-eminence
in innovation.
Because most histories of innovations are focused on successes, and on the
innovations themselves, it is easy to forget that they do not take place in a vacuum,
nor do the hubs of innovations remain the same over time. Before Silicon Valley,
there was a hub of innovative activity around New York’s IBM, as well as the
Boston area (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1993). The changes that led to the shift towards
Silicon Valley as hub for innovation included changes in the markets, technologies,
governance, and educational structures conducive to the particular industries.
And just as the larger innovation ecosystems are an important factor in modern
innovation, so did they play a role in earlier times.
Why Did China Fall Behind in Technological Innovation?
Why did China fall behind in technological innovation relative to western Europe?
We identify three possible answers that speak to parts of the Needham Puzzle.
First, we argue that the Chinese did not develop a scientific method like that in the West (Buck,
1975; Needham & Wang, 1954; Sivin, 1982). Scientists in the West have historically
used deductive logic to spur thinking, but the culture and psychology of Chinese
innovators may be different. The notion of efficacy is important. Francois Jullien
argues the Chinese definition of efficacy relates more to transformation, inertia, and
manipulation than direct action as in the Western context (Jullien, 2004). Chinese
innovation leaders may not recognize that radical innovation is truly valuable.
Thinking styles may also differ. Weimin argues that a lack of deductive logic led to
Chinese emphasis on analogical inference, and because of the emphasis on analogy
in logic, there was no basis for the development of theoretical sciences, only ‘purely
empirical sciences without theoretical elements’ (Weimin, 2009: 414).
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A second characteristic that may have given the West an advantage in
technological innovation was its educational diversity. Following are two examples.
First, Germany made many scientific contributions during the 19th century, notably
in chemistry. However, until 1871 there was no unified Germany; what is now
Germany was instead organized as many separate duchies or principalities. Each
had a need for ‘ministers’ (of two kinds: clergymen and bureaucrats) and many set
up organizations to educate them. It was a competitive environment, and students
and scholars could shop around for the best offers (McClelland, 1980). Political
diversity therefore led to a proliferation of competing educational institutions.
Another example is the system of tertiary education in the United States. It is
a highly decentralized system, with strong competition for faculty and students.
US tertiary education began with private universities, often established for religious
purposes (e.g., Harvard College in 1636), and then the addition of publically-funded
state universities. The Land-Grant movement was a key step in this evolution, with
the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862 that allocated a portion of public lands in
each state for the purpose of higher education (Ross, 1969).
In China, by contrast, the culture of state centralized control, originating with
the beginning of the Qin dynasty, may have created a barrier to economic,
scientific and educational progress (Landes, 2006). It included a ‘monopoly on
education, jealously guarded’ (Landes, 2006: 7), suffocating individual initiative.
Authoritarian leadership and, later, Maoist planning emphasized egalitarianism
and deemphasized individualism and pluralism at all levels (ranging from cultural
to economic). It is hard to see how there could be much room for ‘creativity’ (or any
kind of different or deviant thinking necessary for creativity) in the Schumpeterian
sense so central for innovation, in a system intended to break down and repress
diversity, differentiation, and individual incentives at all levels.[4]
The organizational tendency towards increasing centralization of government
and governance became an inhibitor to innovation, in no small part due to the
influence of the Chinese imperial government, which was highly influenced by
Confucian philosophy.[5] The most talented individuals in the system became
scholar-officials, taking exams based on Confucian classics in order to obtain
appointments to government positions. Although this led to an efficient government
comprised of talented scholar-officials, ‘the incentive structure of the system
diverted the intelligentsia away from scientific endeavors, especially from the
mathematization of hypotheses about nature and controlled experimentation’ (Lin,
1995: 284). Freedom to think was discouraged: ‘The imperial order left little space
for creativity and innovation, even if it remained favorable to the rapid adoption
of techniques developed elsewhere. In order to maintain stability and unity in the
Chinese empire, the dominant values were intolerant of “creative destruction” and
its attendant principles of free competition’ (Baark, 2007: 394).
Confucianism provided the backdrop for much of China’s elite education, but
‘when China realized its need to modernize, Confucianism acted as a negative
inhibiting China’s progression. One of China’s attempts of reform was the
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Self-Strengthening movement in the 1860s. It was based on the notion of preserving
the Chinese essence, the Confucian order, while incorporating Western technology’
(Nguyen, 2009: 33). The inherent conservatism of Confucianism – its desire to
maintain stability – could have acted as a disincentive for reform.
Maoist ideas continue to be praised and cited among modern Chinese; courses
on Maoist philosophy are a regular requirement in Chinese universities. One of
President Xi Jinping’s first speeches to the media in 2012 referenced the strength
of the Chinese people: ‘It is the people who create history. The masses are the real
heroes . . . We deeply understand that the capability of any individual is limited,
but as long as we unite as one, there is no difficulty we cannot overcome’.[6] A
society that celebrates the thinking of a leader who opposed individualism may face
important additional barriers to nurture creativity and innovation, often the results
of deviance. In an evolutionary system, a group needs to have new ideas flowing
in to sustain its capabilities and ability to adapt in the long run (Cohen, March, &
Olsen, 1976; March, 1991).
Third, we argue China’s relationships with other world powers during the
20th century may have played a role in creating a culture of intellectual
isolationism that reinforced the historical and political factors described above.
Herbert Simon and an early delegation of Western scientists visiting China
in the 1970s mentioned the withdrawal of scientific and technical support
by the Soviet Union in the 1960s having led to a strong ‘do it alone’ mentality.
Prior to the Chinese-Soviet break, many Chinese engineers and scientists were
trained in the Soviet Union at technical universities, with Soviet advisers on-site in
many Chinese industrial, scientific, and military facilities. The Soviet withdrawal
engendered Chinese feelings of self-reliance and reinforced close links between
the Chinese government, industry, and academic institutions like the Chinese
Academy of Sciences.[7] Chinese self-reliance has been well documented in military
technologies (e.g., Reed & Stillman, 2009).
THE NEEDHAM PUZZLE AS CAUSE AND EFFECT
Culture, psychology, and technology are related and often embedded in the
organizational context. It is not a society or a country that initiates innovation,
but the individuals within a society; individuals who are often ‘intellectual outliers’
whose ideas do not fit established disciplinary, functional, or bureaucratic boxes,
but whose vision can produce important intellectual and organizational changes.
Broad psychological, organizational, and cultural forces that pervade their society
condition those individuals. We have identified three historical factors that may have
affected individuals’ ability to innovate in China: a different way of approaching
scientific thought, a lack of educational diversity and structural inertia, and a lack
of openness to the outside world.
Resulting at least in part from these differences, the Chinese approach to
the construction and value of knowledge diverges from notions in the West.
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There are two important points. First, it is likely that these factors, to some
extent, persist today. These are not factors that disappear with political or even
technological change; they are psycho-cultural factors embedded in all aspects
of the Chinese innovation system. Second, these factors may have placed China
on a path, early on, toward the exploitation of existing knowledge rather than
the exploration for new knowledge. Baark (2007) has argued how learning and
knowledge in historical China was associated with ‘exploitation’, in March’s (1991)
terminology. Organizations, groups, countries, and societies all face a tradeoff
between exploration and exploitation. Exploration involves the discovery of new
knowledge, to take risks and defer potential benefits in the interest of exploratory
research. Exploitation involves the refinement and elaboration of existing routines
and existing knowledge. It is lower risk, may cost less, and can result in more
immediate returns. If Chinese society emphasizes exploitation at the expense of
exploration, there will be less of an emphasis on technological innovation in the
sense of new idea, product, or technology development and implementation. There
will be more of a focus on the elaboration of existing ideas (refinement of existing
technology) or on conducting low cost search to imitate and implement existing
technologies developed by others. Without exploration routines that produce new
ideas, there is little opportunity for creative destruction in Schumpeter’s sense.
Using March’s (1991) exploration and exploitation framework as inspiration, we
summarize some of the implications of innovation and imitation when it comes to
key elements in organizations:
If, as we argue above, Chinese scientists approach the creation of knowledge
from an exploitation perspective, we would expect Chinese scientific output to be
judged to be less innovative. Chinese scientists would spend more time developing
technology that would work immediately – in the refinement of existing knowledge.
It would be no surprise that Chinese scientists would emphasize imitation; it is low-
cost, low-risk, and faster to acquire existing technology and to refine it through an
exploitation process, rather than develop an exploration routine to generate truly
new knowledge. As a result, China, however successful on the economic front, has
not been able to be at the forefront of innovation – despite the national priority
innovation has become.
Innovations, Economic Growth, and Organizations
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion
comes from the consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that
capitalist enterprise creates (Schumpeter, 1942: 83).
China’s economic growth has spurred the development of a literature examining
the development of innovation systems in Chinese organizations. Innovation is
a means to generate growth; innovative firms take market leadership, leaving
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competitor firms to catch up (Koellinger, 2008; Klomp & van Leeuwen, 2001;
Winter, 2003). They capture early market share and drive the direction of product
or service development. In the organizational and management literature, it is
assumed that an advanced economy will become driven largely by innovation. And
in the economics literature, (technological) innovation has been recognized as the
primer of economic growth since the classical economists such as Alfred Marshall,
Adam Smith, and Karl Marx. Marshall, for instance, wrote about inventions
and improvements leading to innovations and further new ideas underlying the
‘mysteries of the trade’ (Marshall, 1890).
It has been argued that in China, imitation has been important because ‘relative
to utility model and external design, successful discovery of inventions require
higher R&D costs and a longer period of time’ (Cheung & Lin, 2004: 32). For China
to sustain economic growth, business organizations will need to develop stronger
domestic innovation capacity, unless Chinese firms can continue exploiting the
knowledge of innovative firms through knowledge transfer processes, refinement,
and exploitation routines.
Innovation, the search for and discovery, development, improvement, adaptation
and commercialization of new products, processes and organizational structures,
involves uncertainty, trial and error, experimentation, and failures. It is often
embedded in organizational, economic, societal structures, and ecosystems,
enabling connections between universities, scientific communities, and capital. In
the history of most (if not all) modern American innovations, research – basic as well
as applied – has been at the core. Abraham Flexner’s quest for the ‘usefulness of
useless knowledge’ (Flexner, 1939) was not just rhetorical; the pursuit of basic
knowledge for its own sake, not for the instrumentalist search for immediate
applications, underlies many intellectual and organizational innovations in the
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Figure 1. Illustration: Some factors influencing innovation capability
context of US research institutions and organizations. Innovation capability, in
other words, is not something that a country or an organization can pursue or
acquire without attention to the institutional, educational, and socio-cultural factors
in which it is embedded – R&D being the driver of at least Schumpeterian-driven
innovation. There are elements of chance, luck and even randomness, too.
We have discussed some of the structural factors that serve as barriers to Chinese
innovation. These barriers arise from both cultural and structural characteristics of
the Chinese innovation system, as well as legacies of China’s experience with the
Needham paradox and political turmoil during the 20th century. To what extent,
however, are these challenges unique to China? Examining how other national
innovation systems responded to the same challenges could inform how the Chinese
innovation system will address these challenges.
How did the United States’ innovation system develop? As much has been written
about this, we focus just on a few aspects.
During the early years of the 20th century, the number of research labs grew
dramatically. By World War I there were as many as 100 industrial laboratories
in the US and the number tripled during the war. Industrial R&D maintained its
growth even during the Depression. R&D activity conducted in laboratories of US
businesses and governments increased even further during the Second World War
and postwar years – and its important breakthrough included satellites, nuclear
weapons, the transistor, electronic computing, and lasers. The innovations were
often results of basic research and contributions to knowledge, rather than search
for profits – although the desire to win the war and take a national advantage
during the Cold War was certainly contributing factors. As Gertner points out with
regards to Bell Labs, the creativity and large numbers of innovations were results
of the nature of the research there, not pursuit of relevance: ‘Bell Labs cared only
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about academic research excellence. Bell Labs respected and valued its researchers
for their innovation and their contributions to science. Nobody in Bell Labs cared
whether or not a research topic was motivated by a business need or was relevant’
(Gertner, 2003: 50).[8]
Initiatives during the Second World War helped strengthen the role of science
in R&D, and ties between science, engineering, and R&D (including projects such
as the Manhattan Project, the MIT Radiation Lab, and the Office of Scientific
Research and Development). The postwar years also saw further strengthening
of the collaboration between scientists, engineers, and social scientists, creating a
culture and belief of ‘optimistic urgency’ (Augier, March, & Marshall, 2015) that
science and R&D could, and should, help understand important societal problems,
such as those related to the Cold War. The RAND Corporation was the exemplar of
this type of organization, and it initiated many intellectual developments significant
to economics, organization studies and other areas (Augier & March, 2011; Fortun
& Schweber, 1993; Geiger, 2004; Ware, 2008). It also did pioneering research on the
distributed communication networks (leading to the early ARPAnet). The RAND
approach – like Bell Labs and others – combined a high degree of intellectual and
institutional freedom (and lack of bureaucracy) with a problem-driven and inter-
disciplinary approach, and a decentralized vision for projects. DARPA also built on
this vision, developing also organizational design mechanisms for avoiding the kind
of organizational and bureaucratic controls that can hinder intellectual innovations,
such as term limits for program managers – to avoid attracting career bureaucrats.
Many larger societal and institutional transformations occurred in the 1960s
that would initiate movements and ‘counter cultures’ at different levels. And while
some of these counter cultures did lead to other innovations – Steve Jobs is often
cited as a product of the 1960s counter culture – it also led to changes in the
organization of R&D. A new model of R&D evolved in the 1980s and 1990s
with R&D activity becoming decentralized within large organizations themselves.
At the same time, transformations in industry structures were also influenced by
venture capital-funded start-ups, which depended on R&D and began to fund its
development. Larger national, societal and global trends also contributed, leading
to the modern example of a prime innovation culture in Silicon Valley (Adams,
2011; Etzkowitz, 2013; Klepper 2010). Innovations do not result just from scientific
and technological progress, but from a complex interaction of ideas, institutions, and
individuals. Key early people in SV include Frederick Terman (engineer and Provost
of Stanford), Hewlett and Packard, and William Shockley; institutions include HP,
Xerox Park, Stanford, and Apple; and ideas include technologies and products
such as semiconductors, printers, and the Internet. A culture of tolerating, even
appreciating, failure, and enthusiasm for hard work and sharing new ideas helped
produce positive feedback, idea spillovers and other fruitful knowledge sharing
exploits and practices. And an industry structure or architecture accommodating
these emerged. In the United States, it was a combination of decentralization,
cultural willingness to accept failure, and strong innovation ecosystems allowed for
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individual scientists to pursue their research priorities with support mechanisms,
openness to experimentation, and in the context of competition.
In Japan, it was opening that played a key role in revitalizing a nation closed off
to the outside world for hundreds of years. The Japanese didn’t choose to adopt
Western civilization and science. Japan isolated itself in the 1600s when the Toku-
gawa Shogunate took control. No Europeans, who were seen as potential threats,
were allowed into Japan except the Dutch who were permitted one ship a year.
The American Commodore Matthew Perry first visited Japan in 1853, went to
the capital, Edo (now Tokyo), and demanded that ports be opened to Americans,
that prisoners be treated well and given back, and more. The Japanese rejected
his demands and Perry withdrew. Perry returned several months later and told the
Japanese that trade must begin soon and that all further negotiations were to be in
Edo. The Japanese objected but Perry told them that he would move to Edo and
shell the city if necessary.
The Japanese signed the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854, in which the Japanese
promised to save shipwrecked Americans, to provide food, coal, water, and other
provisions for the American ships that docked in Nagasaki and then later at Shimoda
and Hakodate. It also gave the US permission to build a consulate in Shimoda.
They eventually agreed to trade. This ended Japan’s two-hundred-year isolation.
The treaty brought in so much foreign money that the currency was disrupted and
the inability of the Shogun to end the resulting inflation led to its fall and to the Meiji
Restoration with the emperor the daimyo (warlords) returning to power in 1867.
The Treaty of Kanagawa led to Great Britain, Russia, France and the
Netherlands signing ‘unequal treaties’ with Japan which granted to foreign nations
more rights than to Japan and led to the overthrow of the Shogun. Economic
revitalization came at the expense of a reclusive political regime; although both the
Japanese and the United States were able to institute an economy based in large part
on innovative activity, they were able to use decentralization and openness to do so.
THE ROLE OF COMPETITION AND THE LARGER INSTITUTIONAL
CONTEXT
Chinese National Innovation Systems versus Distributed Competition
and R&D
As the examples of innovation system evolution indicate, success or failure in
innovation is not just about the product and processes being invented. The societal
and institutional context for innovation matters a great deal too, as do ideas and
individuals. In competitive economies, people and ideas can fail. R&D efforts
are less coordinated; there is no sorting out of unpromising projects by a central
planner. Markets (within or between organizations) give some screening and natural
selection of ideas and of matching people with ideas and projects, but in the process
of trial and error, many fail. Charles Hitch, former head of the RAND Economics
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Department and President of the University of California system, noted how R&D
processes lead to ‘occasionally happy and frequent unhappy surprises’ (Hitch,
1958: 4). He mentions how organizations noted for their (post war) innovative
research capabilities, such as Bell Labs and Dupont, intentionally decentralized
control of research to laboratory levels (Hitch, 1958). Often, he found, innovative
research grew out of spontaneous efforts in a very decentralized organizational
structure. More recently, Silicon Valley ideas borne out of individual or small
group efforts have also had characteristically decentralized aspects.[9] Accepting
such distributed efforts as a framework for encouraging innovation at the national /
organizational level necessitates at the individual level an acceptance and tolerance
(even embracing) of failure. Thus a necessary, but not sufficient, aspect of the
US innovation system is at the individual / psycho-cultural level, a tolerance of
failure; at the organizational level, encouraging experimentation and acceptance
of deviant ideas; and at the institutional / societal level, decentralization of R&D
and basic research with emphasis more on competition than coordination. The
larger institutional system and government has set the rules of the road to facilitate
decentralization and competition – from education, to immigration and labor laws,
to accounting, to business governance, to taxes and securities listings requirements
– has been one that nurtured differences, trial and error learning, and hard work.
The Chinese context for innovation is very different at all these levels. At the
societal and organizational level, the Chinese government supports its national
innovation system through central S&T plans and close work with relevant research
institutes, as well as other initiatives, such as funding graduate education for Chinese
students abroad. In addition to the emphasis on coordination and central plan, a
key architectural or institutional difference compared to the US is the role of the
national research institutes and the Chinese Academy of Sciences as a key player
in the national research system (and hence, the national efforts to become an
innovation nation), especially as universities and society sought to recover after the
1960s and 1970s social upheaval.
The Cultural Revolution influenced and changed dramatically all aspects of
society in China. Intellectuals were labeled capitalist roaders and removed from
their positions, while a large number of young people were sent to countryside (the
‘rusticated youth’), their education disrupted. Major universities, such as Tsinghua,
were for all purposes closed and even after reopening in the 1970s, enrollments
stayed low and priorities were changed from emphasis on research and scholarship
to practical experience. Even faculty were sent for ‘re-education’ to factories and
farms (Cheatham et al., 1973). Emphasis on practical, not academic/scholarly
training, together with a strong belief in the values of the revolution (and hence, a
larger national goal) led to scientific competencies reached not so much by university
education but by workers being involved in ‘sink-or-swim practical effort in relation
to well understood and believed-in social goal’ (Cheatham et al., 1973: 12).
Although universities suffered during the revolution, the institutes of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences were less affected. Founded in the late 1940s, the Chinese
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Academy of Sciences survived the Cultural Revolution and other upheavals of the
20th century to become the leader in China’s scientific research – government-
run labs administered by CAS conducted significant weapons research (including
testing nuclear devices) and developed close linkages with civilian universities (Reed
& Stillman, 2009).
Herbert Simon, one of the first American scientists to visit China after the
Communist government took power, observed in the 1970s that a key to China’s
development of research in general, and computer science in particular, was
precisely the close cooperation between the Chinese academics and the universities
(Simon, 1973; Cheatham et al., 1973). They even found that when it came to
computer development in China, the universities played a secondary role compared
to the institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, many of which were established
after the formulation of the 1956 12-year plan for the ‘Development of Science and
Technology’ on China (with priority given to fields such as computer technology,
automation and remote control), leading to ‘the pattern of combining industrial
enterprises with the research and development processes of the institutes and
universities’ (Cheatham et al., 1973: 11).
Government also supports the creation of innovation districts. It often develops
central S&T plans for the country and then uses those plans as a platform
to decide on the allocation of resources to the research institutes (Chang &
Shih, 2004: 531). Lu and Lazonick (2001: 56) point to an even more active
role of the government in supporting the ‘institutionalization of organizational
relations among programs, institutes and enterprises’, effectively injecting the
government directly in the development of organizational capabilities as well as
their applications. A possible benefit of this from the point of view of the Chinese
as a whole is that it may lead to a greater sense of loyalty or what Herbert
Simon called ‘organizational identification’ (Simon, 1991) – but on a national
level. Simon used the term to emphasize that not all individuals are motivated
by opportunism or minimizing transaction costs; humans can (and do) have
motives that are more altruistic in purpose. Organizations can sometimes cultivate
and encourage a higher degree of organizational loyalty and identification that
make them more sustainable and less vulnerable to organizational fragmentation.
Simon’s insights hold true for nations, too. Alexander George observed in his
analysis of the organization of the Chinese Army how one of the advantages
of the Chinese way of organizing was the greater emphasis on interpersonal
ties (guanxi) and that the creation of similar ties within different organizational
structures might help group morale, coherence and loyalty (George, 1969). An
organization that greatly benefits from national policies and priorities may be
more inclined to identify with the values and priorities of that nation, which helps
create a greater sense of coherence and common goals. Simon notes that such
group loyalty can serve as a ‘powerful altruistic force’, shaping ‘both participants’
goals and the cognitive models they form of their situations’ (Simon, 1993:
160).
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Table 2. Levels / characteristics of organizational innovation
Psycho-cultural Organizational Institutional/societal
US Tolerance / embrace
of failure;
Distributed R & D, Pursuing
Deviant ideas
Decentralization
China Fear of failure Limited R & D efforts. Prefers
successful imitation to risky
innovation
Coordination and control
through centralized S & T
plans; Chinese Academy of
Sciences as integrator
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have discussed some aspects of innovation and innovative
capabilities in China, aspects of Chinese history and some institutional,
organizational, and psycho-cultural enablers and barriers to innovation. The
Chinese style of innovation has strengths and weaknesses just as most (if not
all) other systems do. Understanding those strengths and weaknesses in terms
of their organizational, psycho-cultural and institutional aspects may be a step
towards understanding the Chinese efforts towards long-term sustainable growth
in the future. For students and scholars of organizations and the management
of organizational processes, an understanding of Chinese (and other emerging
economies) efforts and styles of innovation requires thinking not just through
different disciplines or aspects of the innovation process, but also how differences
at the cultural and psychological level may influence their organizations and their
innovation efforts (Crozier, 1967).
We suggest there are some important aspects of Chinese history and culture that
may have led to Chinese scientists emphasizing exploitation over exploration, and
that these factors may persist today. Namely, we suggest the lack of a scientific
method like that in the west (due to emphasis on analogical versus deductive
reasoning), a relative lack of educational diversity or competition, and a lack of
openness to the outside world, contributed to creating a relatively myopic worldview
where innovation was deemphasized over the refinement of existing knowledge. In
contrast to the United States, which developed a thriving innovation ecosystem,
China’s centralized innovation system may be inhibiting progress.
One thing to keep in mind is that Chinese scientists may not need to become
technological innovators. It is possible that the style of imitation is one that fits
better culturally and organizationally, at least for the foreseeable future, for several
reasons. First, Chinese scientists may not want to ‘prove’ themselves as innovators
again; a more incremental approach may be more consistent with the Chinese
emphasis on embracing the forces external to them (Jullien, 2004). Pye and Leites
noted on the differences between China and the West:
In the West, one’s sense of power is linked more to one’s capabilities, to the
resources one commands, and to one’s internal organization, whether physically
as an individual or administratively as a group. Desires for benefits from power
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beyond the control of any actor is seen as faith in the supernatural and as
inappropriate in worldly activity. . . . The Chinese method is to do little things
so as to benefit from being in tune with big forces, as in the Taoist principle of
triumphing by ‘non-effort.’ This Taoist concept of the weak self conquering by
being in harmony with the external force, the Tao, is matched by the Confucian
notion that if one adheres completely to the ‘right rules of conduct’ one gains
infinite power. The locus of power in both cases is external to self. (Pye & Leites,
1982: 1149–1150)
Applied to Chinese style in innovation, this insight into the psycho-cultural
differences in perceptions of power may help understand why some Chinese
businesses differ in how they engage in foreign direct investment, for instance.
Second, as organization scholars have pointed out, innovation usually involves
many failures, or at least an embrace of the idea of failure. March has even
appealed to seeing innovation as resulting from the kind of ‘teenage delinquency’
or ‘disobedience’ that can also easily lead to trouble (March, 2014); but the point is,
innovators need to break free from existing structures, try new things, fail, and learn
from failures. Organizationally and psychologically, the centrality of failure may be
less appealing to the Chinese researcher that – although embracing of ambiguity –
emphasizes a desire for perfection and low tolerance for failures especially amongst
its youth (Pye & Leites, 1982).
As a society, if China does not embrace some element of tolerance for failure
or playfulness in ideas, it will have a hard time cultivating the kind of creativity
underlying innovations (successful or not). From Picasso to Michelangelo to Steve
Jobs, one has to keep trying in the face of failure, to experiment and be foolish.
Although failing is not in itself fun and it takes tenacity to move on in the face of
failure, Western children often learn humor as a way of coping with failures. Humor
can encourage one to keep trying, and give some perspective on things, but some
Chinese view ‘silliness’ as something to be laughed at, not learned from (Pye &
Leites, 1982: 1151–1152). In the West, people learn through experimentation and
trial and error; even the mistakes and unintended results are parts of the process
of creating long-term variation. In China, practice is means to eliminate mistakes
and to achieve perfection (Pye & Leites, 1982: 1153).
Finally, at the societal level, there is still a larger structural and political argument
that looms and that may influence some of the elements discussed above. As has
been debated since at least Lipset (1959), some degree of political pluralism seems to
be a necessary, although not sufficient, ingredient in long-term economic growth.
We may modify that to say that some degree of political pluralism, in addition
to organizational and institutional decentralization, economic competition, and
a psycho-cultural acceptance of failures and trial and error learning, may be
necessary if China seeks to achieve the kind of innovation-driven growth that US
and many democracies have experienced. If not, China’s march toward becoming
an innovation nation and to ‘solve’ the Needham paradox may be even longer,
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and require China itself to imitate not just inventions, processes and products, but
societal organizing principles too.[10]
NOTES
We are grateful to reviewers and to Arie Lewin for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, and to
Beverly Rowen for many fruitful conversations about topic, and for reminding us about the importance
of Needham’s work in the context of modern debates. Any remaining errors were produced without
help.
[1] And the inventions themselves served to improve other aspects of society, including the
educational system and scholarship. China’s early innovativeness was thus not a silo
phenomenon serving to improve individual products and processes, but also had considerable
spillover effects on different layers of society.
[2] A working definition of innovation is the development of novel and useful technologies or
products that have at least the potential of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter,
1942).
[3] These literatures are rarely brought together, perhaps because many are sub-specialties within
their own (sub) disciplines. The ideas from the psycho-cultural perspective we build on come
from George (1969), Leites (1948) and Pye and Leites (1982), and Pye (2000). While developed
outside of the fields of organizations or management, it offers relevant insights that are quite
consistent with Michel Crozier’s analysis of how French culture influences organizational
behaviors.
[4] As Mao emphasized (contrasting China to Russia): ‘In China the cadres take part in labor; the
workers take part in management; the cadres are sent down for tempering; the old regulations
and systems are destroyed. . . . . Though he [Stalin] urged selfless labour, they would not work
even one extra hour and could not forget the self. . . . Bourgeois rights must be destroyed,
destroyed every day, such as the emphasis on qualifications, the emphasis on grade levels. . . .
The grade system is the father-son relationship, the cat-mouse relationship. It must be destroyed
continuously’ (Mao, 1959).
[5] Ezra Vogel points out in his discussion of industrialization in Asia that when breakthroughs in
industrialization did happen within East Asia, it was in those societies least embedded within
or infused with Confucianism: ‘If anything, just as Max Weber found that the greatest drive
to industrialize in his time came in areas located far from Catholic orthodoxy, so in East Asia
industrialization prospered in areas far from the centers of traditional Confucian orthodoxy,
where trade and commerce were most highly developed’ (1991: 84).
[6] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586
[7] Cheatham and colleagues quote a responsible member of the Revolutionary Committee of
the Peking Institute of Computing Technology (1973): ‘In old China we were oppressed by
feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. At that time we had nothing to say about computers,
science, or technology. By 1959 the electronics industry had developed. We began to set up our
institute in 1956. . . . In the beginning, Russian scientists came to give us help. In 1960 they
withdrew all their people. . . . . Because of the blockage imposed by social imperialism and other
capitalist countries, we have to work by ourselves and we brought up a generation of scientists.
. . . Of course, compared with an advanced technology, there is a gap. But we will follow
Chairman Mao’s teachings; we have determination and ability and will catch up in the future’.
[8] Chinese researchers seem to take an opposite view, emphasizing science for its immediate
commercial applications. Chinese research institutes for example built to ‘earn income and
accumulate funds through such activities as contracting state planned research projects,
undertaking research projects entrusted by other organizations, transferring technological
achievements, operating joint ventures in technology development and export business, and
providing consultancy services’ (Central Committee, 1985: 451). The linking of science with
its immediate applications and profits seems contra to the spirit of knowledge for its own sake
that underlie at least many significant US innovations.
[9] Steve Jobs founding Apple Computers in his garage is a famous example. A key person involved
with the development of unmanned planes in DARPA also did much of his early work in a
garage (Whittle, 2013).
[10] The relation between democracy and growth is of course a more elaborate one. See for example
Lipset (1959) and Rowen (1997).
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